The Supreme Court of Bangladesh delivered judgment on an appeal brought by 5 former Army officers who were held responsible for the 1975 murder of the founding leader of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.  Rahman, known hagiographically as Bangabandhu–the Friend of Bengal– was the  first Prime Minister of Bangladesh.  After electing to switch to a presidential form of government in 1975 he assumed the presidency, and was assassinated later that year.   The verdict: guilty.  The Supreme Court upheld a lower court verdict.  The 5 former officers now face the death penalty. 

Speaking in Rome yesterday, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed, one of two surviving children of the assassinated leader deferred questions on the judgment and said “I just want justice.”  However, Sheikh Hasina Wajed, who is the leader of the ruling Awami League and its coalition has put the states security forces on alert in anticipation of civil unrest.

Security forces maintained control over the grounds of the Supreme Court, the Dhaka Central jail and the homes of the judges involved in the case.

 Acts of violence and the threat of directed harm already have come from unidentified sources.  Jay Shanker reporting for Bloomberg writes:

“Unidentified attackers last month threw a bomb at the car of legislator Fazle Noor Tapas, an Awami League member, Reuters reported at the time. At least a dozen people were injured in the attack. Tapas, who escaped unhurt, is one of the lawyers taking part in the trial process, according to the report.”

Moreover the attorney general received a letter threatening his family if the 5 former officers were not released.

This case resonates deeply with Bangladeshis.  A cadre of Army Officers assassinated the left-leaning and increasing dictator-like, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his extant family–save his two daughters–and were later indemnified from prosecution by a series of right leaning dictatorial governments.  When Sheikh Hasina came to power in 1996 she set in motion the trial of the named individuals and was able to secure a guilty verdict.  However on appeal, the Supreme Court delivered a split decision and when, in 2001, the Awami League lost power, the case ground to a halt.  

When running for office again in 2008 Sheikh Hasina campaigned on the platform to deliver a “just” and satisfactory verdict.  Since the appeal was brought back to the docket, Sheikh Hasina has sent directives to the members of her cabinet and to her supporters, generally, urging them to be wary of political and civil disruptions.  

This judgment could prove cathartic for the nation.  Bangladesh can finally salve its own self-inflicted wounds.  Alternatively, this news could degenerate the political discussion–already retrograde–to a series of accusations and indictments of blame.    Though the rightist BNP has claimed that it will respect the verdict, some party members are sure to suppose that verdict had been made years ago; it is the full-throated declaration from an arm of the state which, until now, had been missing in the proceedings.

On a lark, I’d begun to write today’s post with the idea that I’d deal mainly with the ill-gauged foresight with which even the most vaunted media outlets in the U.S deal with Bangladesh and her political economy and “culture”. With no small irreverence, I’d started the piece with the following declaration and all that it insinuated:

“Its been a long time coming, but I knew a change was gonna come.  Oh yes it did.”

“The  New York Times finally ran a piece yesterday filed by Reuters on the 3 men detained in Bangladesh, for allegedly plotting to bomb the U.S. Embassy and Indian High Commission in Dhaka”  

However, as I investigated the depth of Times coverage on Bangladesh, I saw that The Grey Lady had published a short piece on November 6th, on just the story that I’d been writing on. And in fact, the piece had described the implications of the arrest in Chittagong of the 3 Bangladeshi’s than had the local news outlets. I’d argue that this, more piece-meal approach, exemplified by the Daily Star’s reporting has to do with the greater focus that Bangladeshi news media seem to place on local parliamentary politics and the fact that interested readers follow a story from day to day.  On the other hand I’d argue that the U.S see the world through our geo-political–perhaps, more real politikal– interests.  However, unlike, say, demonstrated by the media coverage of Bangladesh in the U.K, its an interest that stakes more bold claim on more obvious facts of the matter, and is less concerned with socio-economic and demographic trends that form the background conditions for those facts.

So today, I’d like to parse out in an explanatory manner, some of the reasons that might relate to the two different types of media coverage that play out between, say the BBC and the New York Times.  (Please understand that in discussing these issues, I do not claim to have ANY expertise in the matter, whatsoever; rather I claim to want to understand by putting forward in writing some propositions that might help me understand, above and beyond whatever understanding my frail mind, recursively, allows.  I also realize that the BBC is a larger conglomeration of media units than the Times, and as such is able to source material in a way that the Times cannot.  Nevertheless, I think my argument is sound.)

A first pass at the issue would have to look at the operating costs of running a international bureau for each of the two media outlets that I’ve chosen to examine.  The NY Times, for instance, runs most of its pieces on Bangladesh from its South Asia desk, headed by Somini Sengupta.  Alternatively it runs pieces sourced from newswires like Reuters–presumably to cut costs.  The Times is not partially publicly funded as is the BBC and since, its costs of operation have steadily increased as its subscriptions rolls have steadily decreased, without government subsidy the unspoken claims of NY Times’ exposure of Bangladesh have not had a comparable impact.

However, this does not explain, the Times’ historical bias toward a largely national security and food security take on Bangladesh.  Even a casual examination of the BBC website when compared to the NY Times website shows that the BBC is interested in the sociological background conditions in which Bangladesh and Bangladeshi’s find themselves.  I propose that the reasons are two  fold.  In the first case, historical conditions have made it feasible that the UK should remain interested in Bangladesh; in the second, political economic interests have made it necessary for, say, the BBC to remain engaged in Bangladesh.  I want to push the issue and say, that combined, they make for a powerful cocktail,which independent of the other might, see each motive recede to the background.

Bangladesh is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, the 53 members states that, for the most part, were former colonies of th British Empire.  This historical trajectory from colony to commonwealth lives on in a certain sociological anchor that can traced from a country’s general consent to govern itself through parliamentary politics (the unicameral Sangshad Bhaban, the  bicameral Sansad Bhavan, composed of the Lok and Rajya Sabha) to the kinds of sports enjoyed by a streaming multitude (football, cricket, polo, in certain locales.)  The British empire has left its mark.  In 1971, the United States of America looked away from her horrific countenance, when Bangladesh, standing her ground, looked west ward for some manna.

Consider that the BBC published a piece on Bangladesh’s recent ban on the Islamist group Hizbut Tahrir.  Though it is not known to have committed any acts of terrorism on Bangladeshi soil, nevertheless, its proscription is a piece of good news for students of counter-terrorism and political ideology.  I have been unable to find a similar piece in the Times.  I can only think that its absence has much to do with the fact that no American interests were harmed or directly aided by this move.

Consider also that the BBC is launching a show about contemporary Bangladeshi life , though a caricature and a fiction.  Though this show is meant to inspire Bangladeshi immigrants to learn English, and is therefore a piece of public policy, nevertheless a move does indicate that the BBC is interested in understanding the sociological conditions at work in places like Sylhet and East London.  And this is the crux of the second explanatory reason why the BBC is interested in Bangladesh: it has the readership and the viewing public to make its investments worthwhile.  However since the interests are political economic and they attach to “real” human beings from a certain country, it necessitates a cultural stance on propositions in which Bangladesh might, at least, feign attention.  The New York Times, though the paper of record, and arguably the most widely read newspaper in the world, does not feel the pulse of incoming receipts as does the BBC.  The Times does not pay attention to Bangladesh because apart from the sheer cost to do so, because there’s little to be gained from constant attention.The specific history under which the U.S. relates to Bangladesh makes it unlikely that U.S. media outlets will show interest in Bangladesh within some perceptively lived span of time.

I am not making a claim that the Times has breached some normative injunction on “proper coverage of politics in far flung countries” but rather have tried to fumble through an explanatory take on why the Times thinks it unfeasible (perhaps, even impossible) to cover Bangladesh in a manner consistent with her import to South Asian politics.

I’ve been following the news of three Bangladeshi men who’ve been  implicated in an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Dhaka.  One of these men is the son of a leader of a major Islamist political party in Bangladesh. I will continue to follow this story, but promise that there will be much else to discuss.  After all, there’s much else to discuss about Bangladesh; she’s not a country that should command our attention only when some named Hurricane or typhoon hits her coasts, or when some ambitious man wins a Nobel Prize.

Nevertheless, Bangladesh is now being written into–perhaps, she’s writing herself into–the political narrative of the fight against international terrorism.  And it is for that reason that I’d like to devote a few more gigabytes to this story.

To wit, 3 Pakistani’s nationals who are affiliated with Lashkar e Taiba and are still out and about in Bangladesh have been named as co-conspirators in an attempted bombing of the U.S Embassy AND the Indian High Commission before the annual Hajj, which takes place later this month in Saudi Arabia.

As the Daily Star reported yesterday:

“Officials of the Detective Branch of police said they received the information from detained Bangladeshi LeT leader Mufti Harun Izahar, son of Islami Oikya Jote leader Mufti Izaharul Islam, and Harun’s associates Shahidul Islam and Al Amin alias Saiful.”

“The detectives said during interrogation, the arrestees divulged that three Pakistani nationals aged around 30 came to Bangladesh two months back to execute the attack plan with the help of Harkatul Jihad al Islami members.”

“The LeT men also had plans to attack embassy officials or explode bombs in front of the diplomatic missions, said DB officials.”

So here we observe two internationally organized Islamist groups align together to engage in political terrorism.  The interesting question is: Are their incentives aligned together, in parallel, even now?  I can see that before they were found and arrested the Bangladeshi plotters would have been eager to set off an attack and get the private acknowledgment of their co-conspirators like Lashkar in Pakistan and elsewhere.  Moreover, because politics and terrorism borne of politics is all about street credibility, Huji might have been trying to wrest some glory from Jamaat-ul Mujahideen, the largest Islamist terrorist organization in Bangladesh.

But now that they have been found, I’d think they are more likely to cooperate with the authorities.  Already, they seem convinced that cooperating with the authorities and defecting against each other is a better move than stonewalling.  Let’s hope that the prisoner’s dilemma plays out here, and they divulge more information than they needed to save their necks.

Indeed, I wonder whether this spate of news will have some observable impact on the forthcoming reshuffle of the BNP executive committees.

Now that our quiet and uncomfortable introductions are out of the way, I’d like to point to another article that follows up on the one I wrote about yesterday.  The Daily Star reports that :

“The Detective Branch of police produced Mufti Harun Izahar, son of Islami Oikya Jote leader Mufti Izaharul Islam, Shahidul Islam and Al Amin alias Saiful before the metropolitan magistrate’s court seeking their 10-day remand, said Sanwar Hossain, Assistant Commissioner of DB.”

“Meanwhile, Izaharul Islam, chairman of an IOJ faction, protested the arrest of his son Harun Izahar and the two others denying their involvement with LeT [Lashkar-e-Taeyeba]or Huji [Harkatul Jihad al Islami."

"[Detective Branch] officials said Izahar, [the suspect arrested yesterday, son of a leader of the Islami Oikyo Jote, an Islamist political party aligned with the BNP] along with another suspect, did recce [reconnoiter] of the US embassy area several times to devise an attack plan. They also detected several calls the three made to several Pakistani militant leaders.”

This is stunning news.  The Islami Oikyo Jote or the Islamic United Front was a member of the ruling coalition in power from 2001 to 2006, led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).  Whatever the leadership status of Mufti Izaharul Islam, this news means that a political party that had parliamentary seats in the Bangladeshi Parliament, the Sangsad Bhaban for over 5 years is allegedly involved in acts of terrorism aimed against the U.S. and against the interests of the people of Bangladesh.  It beggars the imagination, but try to put together in your mind a set of circumstances where the son of one of the leaders of Angela Merkel’s center right coalition in power in Germany were arrested and charged with plotting to bomb the U.S Embassy in Berlin.  But here we are  a step removed: the BNP is no longer in power.  The left leaning Awami League can prosecute this case.  It remains to be seen whether it will do so.

In 2006 the International Crisis Group published this assessment of the course of political development in Bangladesh.  Among other things the piece argued  that:

“Islamic militancy has flourished in a time of dysfunctional politics, popular discontent and violence. The questions of whether Bangladesh’s traditional moderation and resilience will see it through or whether escalating violence and political confrontation could derail its democracy are vital ones. Serious instability in the world’s third most populous Muslim country could not fail to have wider implications. The situation does not justify great anxiety about the outbreak of major conflict domestically or the nurturing of significant extremism and terrorism internationally but there are elements of fragility in the system which need close watching and engagement.”

I don’t think even the interested and knowledgeable reader of Bangladeshi politics would find much difference in the state of Bangladeshi political development now–going on 3 years since this piece was published.